InhaltsangabeAcknowledgements.- Chapter 1. Introduction: Contributions to Social Ontology-Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents; Anita Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid.- Part I: Intentionality and Institutions.- Chapter 2. Document Acts; Barry Smith.- Chapter 3. Searlean Reflections on Sacred Mountains; Filip Buekens.- Chapter 4. Social Objects without Intentions; Brian Epstein.- Chapter 5. The Logical Form of Totalitarianism; Jennifer Hudin.- Chapter 6. Groups, Normativity and Disagreement; Rodrigo E. Sànchaz Brigido.- Chapter 7. Joint Actions, Social Institutions and Collective Goods: A Teleological Account; Seumas Miller.- Chapter 8. Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality: A Taxonomy in Social Ontology; Francesca De Vecchi.- Part II: Shared Emotions and Recognition.- Chapter 9. Emergence and Empathy; Ronald De Sousa.- Chapter 10. The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups; Mikko Salmela.- Chapter 11. Feelings of Being-Together and Caring With; H. Andrés Sànchez Guerrero.- Chapter 12. Joining the Background: Habitual Sentiments behind We-Intentionality; Emanuele Caminada.- Chapter 13. Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others; Arto Laitinen.- Chapter 14. The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership; Titus Stahl.- Part III: Collective Reasons and Group Agency.- Chapter 15. Acting Over Time, Acting Together; Michael E. Bratman.- Chapter 16. How Where We Stand Constrains Where I Stand: Applying Bratman's Account of Self-Governance to Collective Action; Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko.- Chapter 17. Team Reasoning and Shared Intention; Abraham Sesshu Roth.- Chapter 18. Collective Intentionality and Practical Reason; Juliette Gloor.- Chapter 19. The SANE Approach to Real Collective Responsibility; Sara Chant.- Chapter 20. Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?; András Szigeti.- Chapter 21. Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit-Theory; Vuko Andric.- Chapter 22. Direct and Indirect Common Belief; Emiliano Lorini and Andreas Herzig.

InhaltsangabeAcknowledgements.- Chapter 1. Introduction: Contributions to Social Ontology-Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents; Anita Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid.- Part I: Intentionality and Institutions.- Chapter 2. Document Acts; Barry Smith.- Chapter 3. Searlean Reflections on Sacred Mountains; Filip Buekens.- Chapter 4. Social Objects without Intentions; Brian Epstein.- Chapter 5. The Logical Form of Totalitarianism; Jennifer Hudin.- Chapter 6. Groups, Normativity and Disagreement; Rodrigo E. Sànchaz Brigido.- Chapter 7. Joint Actions, Social Institutions and Collective Goods: A Teleological Account; Seumas Miller.- Chapter 8. Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality: A Taxonomy in Social Ontology; Francesca De Vecchi.- Part II: Shared Emotions and Recognition.- Chapter 9. Emergence and Empathy; Ronald De Sousa.- Chapter 10. The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups; Mikko Salmela.- Chapter 11. Feelings of Being-Together and Caring With; H. Andrés Sànchez Guerrero.- Chapter 12. Joining the Background: Habitual Sentiments behind We-Intentionality; Emanuele Caminada.- Chapter 13. Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others; Arto Laitinen.- Chapter 14. The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership; Titus Stahl.- Part III: Collective Reasons and Group Agency.- Chapter 15. Acting Over Time, Acting Together; Michael E. Bratman.- Chapter 16. How Where We Stand Constrains Where I Stand: Applying Bratman's Account of Self-Governance to Collective Action; Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko.- Chapter 17. Team Reasoning and Shared Intention; Abraham Sesshu Roth.- Chapter 18. Collective Intentionality and Practical Reason; Juliette Gloor.- Chapter 19. The SANE Approach to Real Collective Responsibility; Sara Chant.- Chapter 20. Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?; András Szigeti.- Chapter 21. Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit-Theory; Vuko Andric.- Chapter 22. Direct and Indirect Common Belief; Emiliano Lorini and Andreas Herzig.